Brains

Scientist on the Science of the Self

2012-02-04T17:15:43Z

Brainers may be interested to know about the new blog of Steve Fleming on the science of the self: The Elusive Self

New Philosophers' Carnival

2012-01-30T16:27:40Z

Is the mind is a Turing machine? How could we tell?

2012-01-28T12:14:48Z

I have just finished writing a draft of paper on Turing machines being equivalent (or not) to human minds. This is an expanded (but still quite brief in many respects) version of my talk from the last year's Studia Logica conference on Church's Thesis. I defend the mechanist account of implementation of computation, and show that it can be used to make sense of Fodor's 1968 distinction between the weak and strong equivalence of computer simulations to their explanatory targets. I think some of the cross-talk in discussions concerning the multiple realization is due to conflating these two kinds of equivalence.

The paper is available here, and all comments are welcome. It is one of the papers that I started writing when working on my book Explaining the Computational Mind (the draft is available here).

Budapest Semester in Cognitive Science

2012-01-26T23:43:49Z

If you have undergraduate students looking for an interesting study abroad experience that will keep them on track in their philosophy, psychology, computer science, or cognitive science major, please point them towards the Budapest Semester in Cognitive Science (http://www.bscs-us.org/).

It is a really good program, and has had regular participation from scholars doing interesting research in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, such as Colin Allen, John Bickle, Ron Chrisley, Carl Craver, Peter Erdi, and George Kampis.

The official program announcement is below. If you or your students have any questions about the program, please contact me (tony.chemero@fandm.edu) or the program office at bscs@bscs-us.org.

Cheers,

Tony Chemero

US Director of BSCS

----

The BUDAPEST SEMESTER IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE (BSCS, website: www.bscs-us.org), our Hungarian study abroad program that may be of interest to undergraduate students in Cognitive Science and other disciplines.

BSCS, established in 2003 focuses on cognitive science from an interdisciplinary perspective and offers credit-earning courses in neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, linguistics, biology, and computer science; as well as continuous and optional intensive Hungarian language courses. The program is complemented by an optional independent research module tailored to students' curricula and research interests.

BSCS is hosted by the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at Eotvos Lorand University (ELTE), Hungary's premium science university established in 1635 and serving as a centre of excellence for modern higher education. A world-class new campus has been added to the premises of ELTE, built on the scenic banks of the Danube and hosting the Faculties of Natural and Social Sciences and Informatics, where BSCS courses are held.

Budapest provides an excellent and highly inspiring setting and our vibrant metropolis is a hub of a wide range of interdisciplinary studies and research; boasting a bustling Central European experience with a growing English-speaking academic community. Furthermore, the city serves as a gateway to Vienna, Prague and other major attractions of the region.

The application deadline for the Fall 2012 semester is April 15.

Visit our website for more detailed information (www.bscs-us.org). Email inquiries to bscs@bscs-us.org, or to Tony Chemero, US Director, tony.chemero@fandm.edu.

successful vs. unsuccessful psychopaths

2012-01-25T20:41:31Z

Bill Hirstein and I have just submitted a paper to the SPP on the criminal culpability of successful vs. unsuccessful psychopaths, and I'm hoping to generate a bit of discussion on the distinction.

Gao and Raine recently published a review of studies distinguishing the two populations within five types of samples: a community recruited sample, individuals from temporary employment agencies, college students, psychopaths employed in business and industry, and psychopathic serial killers (Gao and Raine 2010). Studies suggest that unsuccessful psychopaths have reduced prefrontal and amygdala volumes and hippocampal abnormalities, resulting in reduced executive functioning, including impaired decision-making. Unsuccessful psychopaths also exhibit impaired autonomic/somatic markers and fear-conditioning deficits which contribute to poor and risky decision-making. In contrast, successful psychopaths do not show similar structural and functional impairments of the prefrontal cortex, amygdala and hippocampus. They seem to have intact autonomic function and possibly enhanced executive functioning when compared with normals. Gao and Raine hypothesize that successful psychopaths may have superior cognitive empathy (the ability to understand another’s perspective) without emotional empathy (feeling empathetic emotions).

Our hypothesis is that unsuccessful psychopaths’ deficiencies in executive processing may be severe enough to constitute evidence of diminished mental capacity. Many successful psychopaths, on the other hand, seem to have a healthy enough executive profile to correct for their lack of emotional empathy. In philosophical terms, they could have done otherwise. Like a colorblind driver, or a high-functioning autistic person, successful psychopaths would seem to have the ability to take note of their emotional/cognitive lack and make up for it so as to avoid violating the law. If an offender is capable of (knowingly) following a law, she is responsible when she does not.

I'd be happy to hear any comments on this line of thought, and to pass along the whole paper to anyone interested.

Templeton Foundation Open Submission--Starting Soon!

2012-01-25T15:01:20Z

As part of its spring open submission cycle, the John Templeton Foundation welcomes online funding inquiries in the areas of philosophy and theology. The submission window is February 1 to April 16, 2012. Proposed philosophical projects need not have religion or theology as a focus. To submit an online funding inquiry, please visit www.templeton.org/what-we-fund/our-grantmaking-process .

Please note that the Templeton Foundation does not normally provide dissertation fellowships through this open submission process. For more information on the kinds of projects that the Foundation can support, visit www.templeton.org/what-we-fund/core-funding-areas/science-and-the-big-questions.

A list of Foundation grants in the areas of philosophy and theology can be found here: http://www.templeton.org/what-we-fund/grant-search/results/taxonomy:5.

CO4 Program

2012-01-17T13:02:50Z

The program for the 4th Online Consciousness Conference is coming together nicely and is nearly finalized. Check it out! The Conference is scheduled for February 17th-March 2nd. Papers will be available online one week before the conference begins. Mark your calendars and spread the word!!

Greetings

2012-01-15T10:50:20Z

Gualtiero kindly gave me an account here, so I am left with the problem of what to post. A brief introduction. I have a background in analytic philosophy, first in the philosophy of perception, mostly studying nineteenth century theories of perception and consciousness, and then in philosophy of language, focusing particularly on medieval theories of language, and to some extent medieval theories of intentionality and consciousness. I recently completed a translation of an early work by Duns Scotus with Jack Zupko of Winnipeg university.

I am not sure what the medieval word for 'consciousness' would be. They wrote in Latin, and the word 'conscious' derives from the Latin 'conscio', which does mean to be conscious, but in the general sense of joint knowledge, being privy to some fact etc. It is closely related to 'conscientia', which means something like our word 'conscience'. Augustine says Nulla enim definitionum illarum timenda est, cum bene sibi conscius est animus, using the word 'conscius', but what he probably means by 'bene sibi conscius est animus' is that the soul (or mind) has a good conscience. This reminds me of the distinction between 'mind' and 'soul' which the scholastic philosophers were careful to draw, and I wonder if the modern 'consciousness' means something like what they meant by 'soul'. We tend to avoid 'soul', of course, perhaps because of the religious implications.

The medievals also frequently used the word 'intellectus' which translates loosely as 'understanding', but can also be translated as 'concept' or 'conception'.

Anyway, enough rambling. To bring me up to date from the medieval period and the early nineteenth century where I got stuck, could the readers of this blog give me a few signposts about some very general questions. What are the current 'canonical problems' in the philosophy of mind? Who are the main writers in this area? Do we distinguish the philosophy of mind from sciences like pychology, psychiatry, neuroscience and so on?

Edward

Philosophers' Carnival

2012-01-09T18:16:04Z

Here.

Women Working in the Philosophy of Mind

2012-01-09T15:46:08Z

Inspired by Trent Dougherty's efforts at Certain Doubts to compile a list of women working in epistemology, Carolyn, Brit, and I have spent some time doing the same for the philosophy of mind. Let me quote Trent's justification for such a project:

I suspect that one of the most common sources of women being under-represented (even at a rate lower than their under-representation in the field) at conferences and in edited volumes (full disclosure: one of my three edited volume projects has no women in it) is the “comes to mind” bias. One way to counteract this is to “double check.” But that will not be equally easy for everyone and may have pitfalls of its own.

In light of this, clearly some sort of "master list" can be a very valuable resource. Our initial attempt at making such a list is available at the link below. Please note that this is only a first draft, and we are sure it is error-ridden and has left off far too many people, so please suggest additions and corrections over e-mail or in the comments to this post. I will update the file periodically. Thanks!

Women Working in the Philosophy of Mind (Draft of 6. January 2011)

New Contributors Welcome

2012-01-03T15:26:02Z

Thanks to its ever growing community of contributors, Brains's traffic has increased to about 150-300 unique visitors per day. As I said before, Brains is a service to the community of scholars interested in the philosophy of mind and related sciences. Anyone who belongs in this community and would like to contribute to Brains is welcome to contact me.

CFP: Consciousness and Moral Cognition

2011-12-27T14:33:05Z

Mark Phelan (Lawrence) and Adam Waytz (Northwestern) are guest editing a special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology on consciousness attribution in moral cognition. Guest authors include: Kurt Gray (Maryland), Edouard Machery (Pittsburgh) and Justin Sytsma (East Tennessee State), and Anthony I. Jack (Case Western Reserve) and Philip Robbins (Missouri).

Submissions are due March 31, 2011.

The full CFP, including relevant dates and submission details, is available here.

Here is an abbreviated CFP: When people regard other entities as objects of ethical concern whose interests must be taken into account in moral deliberations, does the attribution of consciousness to these entities play an essential role in the process? In recent years, philosophers and psychologists have begun to sketch limited answers to this general question. However, much progress remains to be made. We invite contributions to a special issue of The Review of Philosophy and Psychology on the role of consciousness attribution in moral cognition from researchers working in fields including developmental, evolutionary, perceptual, and social psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and philosophy.

Consciousness and Moral Cognition

2011-12-26T23:44:50Z

The Review of Philosophy and Psychology has just released a call for papers for a special issue on Consciousness and Moral Cognition.

In essence, the editors are interested in questions about how people's attributions of consciousness affect their moral judgments. Do people think that they have a greater obligation to creatures that have phenomenal consciousness than they do to creatures that only have non-phenomenal mental states?

Just in the past few years, there have been a couple of really exciting empirical papers on this topic. The psychologists Kurt Gray, Liane Young and Adam Waytz have a pretty amazing paper arguing that part of the very essence of moral judgment is an ability to see the victim as being capable of a certain kind of experience. But then again, Adam Arico, Brian Fiala, Rob Goldberg and Shaun Nichols have suggested that people ascribe consciousness using the very same process they use to ascribe any other psychological state, and Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery have claimed that ordinary people don't even have the notion of phenomenal consciousness.

Regardless of whether you have read any of these earlier papers, I'm just curious to hear what you think about these issues. Do ascriptions of consciousness actually play any special role in moral judgment? What do you think?

APA Session on Grant Opportunities

2011-12-24T16:36:56Z

If you are attending the APA, consider attending the Session on Grant Opportunities organized by the APA Committee on Lectures, Publications, and Research. All of the agencies we contacted in organizing this session (including a number that were not able to attend the panel) noted that they are very interested in increasing the number of philosophers obtaining grants. Please also share this information with Junior colleagues and graduate students -- they will surely benefit as well! Best wishes

Wednesday, December 28th
GROUP SESSION III – 11:15 A.M.-1:15 P.M.

GIII-1. APA Committee Session: Grant Opportunities for Philosophers
Arranged by the APA Committee on Lectures, Publications and Research
11:15 a.m.-1:15 p.m.
Chair: Carol C. Gould (Hunter College/Graduate Center–City University of New York)
Speakers: Frederick Kronz (National Science Foundation)
Steven Ross (National Endowment for the Humanities)
Jason Boffetti (National Endowment for the Humanities)
Suzanne Brown-Fleming (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum)

Neuroscience Boot Camp

2011-12-21T16:56:31Z

Each summer, Penn Neuroscience Boot Camp gives participants a basic foundation in cognitive and affective neuroscience and equips them to be informed consumers of neuroscience research.

Neuroscience is increasingly relevant to a number of professions and academic disciplines beyond its traditional medical applications. Lawyers, educators, economists and businesspeople, as well as scholars of sociology, philosophy, applied ethics and policy, are incorporating the concepts and methods of neuroscience into their work. Indeed, for any field in which it is important to understand, predict or influence human behavior, neuroscience will play an increasing role. The Penn Neuroscience Boot Camp is designed to give participants a basic foundation in cognitive and affective neuroscience and to equip them to be informed consumers of neuroscience research.

The intensive summer institute covering basic neuroscience is geared towards professionals and graduate students in law, ethics, education, business, and other fields. Through a combination of lectures, break-out groups, laboratory visits and more, participants will gain an understanding of the methods of neuroscience and key findings on the cognitive and social-emotional functions of the brain, and disorders of brain function.

The total cost to attend Neuroscience Boot Camp is $4,500.00. This cost includes tuition, housing, breakfast, lunch and three evening receptions. Limited scholarship aid is also available.

Complete applications are due by midnight on Feb. 3rd, 2012. For more information and to apply:

visit www.neuroethics.upenn.edu

email bootcamp@neuroethics.upenn.edu

call 215-573-8534

CFP: Interdisciplinary Graduate Conference on Consciousness at Boston University

2011-12-16T16:53:31Z

"Boston University is hosting its fourth annual Interdisciplinary Graduate Conference on Consciousness (IGCC) on April 13th and 14th 2012. This year's theme is Consciousness at the Margins. We are particularly interested in papers on issues in implicit bias and subconscious emotions. Psychologist Mahzarin R. Banaji and philosopher Owen Flanagan will be this year's keynote speakers. The purpose of IGCC is to promote interdisciplinary dialogue in the academic study of consciousness among interested graduate students working in philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, computer science, and other related disciplines. We invite papers between 2000 and 3000 words (suitable for a 30-minute talk).

Multi-authored submissions spanning two or more fields are particularly welcome. Recent graduates and junior-level researchers are encouraged to submit. Submit anonymized papers to consciousgrads@gmail.com by February 15th, 2012. Please see http://www.bu.edu/conscious for details."

Cognitive Access: The Only Game in Town

2011-12-13T23:14:23Z

[cross-posted @ Philosophy Sucks!]

In Ned Block's recent paper, published in Trends In Cognitive Science, he has defended his argument that perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access from several recent objections (including from me). It is important that Block is defending overflow from cognitive access since he admits that perceptual consciousness does not overflow all access. Phenomenal consciousness consists in there being something that it is like for the subject of the experience and this suggests that there must be some kind of access to the experience. Block has elsewhere argued that some non-cognitive form of access can account for this but no account of non-cognitive access to date can explain what needs to be explained. Given this the anti-overflow position should remain the default until/unless we have much stronger evidence than what Block presents. Block suggests that there is a philosophical fallacy in the assumption that non-overflow is the default and in the insistence that we need strong evidence to overthrow the non-overflow position but this is not fallacious. It is the reasonable thing to do when you have very weak evidence that is consistent with two competing theories and one of those theories appeals to a mysterious place-holder concept while the other doesn't.

Block suggests two possible forms of non-cognitive access. The first is a deflationary account and the second is a version of a self-representational theory. On the deflationary account we are aware of our mental states just in the having of them, in much the same way that we smile our own smiles just by smiling. Recall that what we are trying to explain is how a particular experience comes to be for the person who has it. When I feel a pain, not only do I experience the painful quality but I also experience it as mine. How can the deflationary account handle this? The deflationary account applies equally well to any state that happens to be instantiated in the brain. We can say that we are aware, in this way, of a state in the LGN, for instance, but surely we don't want to say that it is phenomenally conscious.

The same problems arise for a self-representational account. One kind of self-representational account, holds that the higher-order awareness is itself a part of the state that it represents. But this is a variant of a cognitive access theory. Block seems to want a notion of self-representation that amounts to the state in question merely being instantiated (in the way a color sample represents the color just by being that particular color). But then every state would be conscious since every state represents itself merely by being instantiated. In fact every representation self-represents itself in this way but we don't want to say that sentences are phenomenally conscious!

These notions of non-cognitive access are too weak to distinguish conscious mental states from unconscious mental states, or from any kind of brain activity at all. On the other hand a higher-order cognitive representation explains how a mental state can be for me; I am representing myself as being in that state, in some suitable way, so I will naturally experience the state as mine.

Block endorses only the reasonableness of tentatively accepting the overflow conclusion. But until we have a notion of non-cognitive access that can explain how a mental state can be experienced as mine that is at least as satisfactory as that given by cognitive access we need much stronger evidence than what Block presents to accept overflow.

New Philosophers' Carnival

2011-12-12T17:16:45Z

Here.

Perceptual Learning through Neurofeedback Alone

2011-12-11T22:59:31Z

Recently a talented vision scientist in my lab published a paper in Science showing that one can induce perceptual learning in an experimental participant through neurofeedback alone (i.e. they were able to improve the fit between the participants' brain activity and an fMRI decoder for a particular orientation by asking the participants to "somehow regulate activity in the posterior part of the brain to make the solid green disc that was presented 6 s later as large as possible," where the participants had no idea what increasing the size of that disc represented in their brain). As one blog puts it, "BU wizards find success in unconscious neurofeedback learning, announce plans for secret lair." Impressive stuff!

Chancellor’s Fellowships in Edinburgh

2011-12-11T16:52:52Z

Anyone looking, or temptable to be on, the job market might be interested in the following fellowships (they may not be aware of them since these may not appear in Jobs for Philosophers)...

They are a pretty amazing deal: 5 years of research time with a permanent lectureship at the end.

One of the areas that they are looking to hire is cognitive science, including philosophy of cognitive science: http://www.docs.csg.ed.ac.uk/HumanResources/Strategic_areas_for_appointment.doc

http://www.jobs.ac.uk/job/ADQ364/chancellors-fellowships/

Chancellor’s Fellowships

Humanities and Social Science

University of Edinburgh

The University of Edinburgh, a global top 20 University located in one of the world’s fine cities, is making a major investment in the future of its academic staff with the appointment of prestigious tenure-track Fellowships across all disciplines. These 5-year Fellowships are intended to support outstanding candidates at the start of their independent academic career. Up to 100 positions are available.

A Chancellor’s Fellow will already show the ability to conduct world-leading research and exhibit clear potential to become an international leader in their discipline. The Fellow will be able to concentrate on research in the first instance, acquiring the full duties of University Lecturer across the period of the Fellowship. Subject to satisfactory review at the end of 3 years, the Fellow will move to an open contract on the University academic staff.

Appointment will normally be made on the Lecturer scale (£36,862 - £44,016), dependent on experience, and in exceptional circumstances a more senior appointment may be made. Some positions are available with immediate effect and it is expected that successful applicants will be in post from August 2012.

Applications containing a detailed CV and a 1-page outline of a proposed research programme should be made online at www.jobs.ed.ac.uk to meet one of the closing dates below. General advice may be obtained by emailing chancellorsfellows@ed.ac.uk and specific details may be obtained from the appropriate Head of School.

Salary Scale: £36,862 - £44,016

Please quote vacancy reference: 3015150JW

Closing dates: 16 January, 29 February and 16 April 2012