At the beginning of September, we had another (already 6th) Kazimierz Naturalism Workshop in Kazimierz Dolny, and yesterday I just got back from GAP7 and a after-GAP7 workshop on reductionism, explanation and metaphors in philosophy of mind. Though contrary to your expectations, Carl Craver wasn't talking about mechanisms in Kazimierz but on moral psychology, many speakers really used the new mechanism framework. Somehow connected to this is the fact that more and more philosophers are skeptical about intrinsic properties without causal powers: while it was immensely popular to talk on qualia as intrinsic properties, and then wonder why they seem to be epiphenomenal (which, on most definitions of 'intrinsic', was simply related to their intrinsicness). This showed both in Kazimierz and in Bremen: Tim Crane was vindicating our everyday talk of persons as having causal powers, Tadek Ciecierski and Michael Esfeld were showing that the notion of intrinsic property is not ontologically innocent, to say the least (Esfeld went as far as to defend a revised version of type-identity theory), Markus Eronen was showing, among other things, that Woodward's interventionist causation is hardly compatible with what Jaegwon Kim claims about mental causation... The framework of mechanisms was used directly by Andreas Bartels in Bremen and by a several speakers in Kazimierz. We also had some interesting discussions around the notion of realization with Tom Polger in Kazimierz and Robert Van Gulick in Bremen, and many doubts regarding multiple realizability - David Papineau was showing that higher-level laws in special sciences are not just disorderly connections as suggested by Fodor's picture but related to the functional design of the properties (again, this is quite in accord with the mechanistic thinking). I think that traditional discussions on reduction and emergence - and we had Alvaro Moreno talking on emergence, at least implicitly, in Kazimierz - take a new twist within the mechanistic framework.

In Kazimierz, we had also a very interesting debate on how formal and mathematical philosophy of mind should be with Ricardo Sanz, who was quite radical on the subject, and that is somehow related to the point made by Raphael van Riel in Bremen who claimed that you can recognize a lower-lever description by its higher 'resolution' and higher level of detail. Though I doubt that this difference between levels could be used to warrant asymmetry of reduction relation (I think that Stephan Hartmann was right to point out that the key is higher informativeness rather than levels per se), higher-level sciences are usually paying less attention to quantitative properties...