Brains


On Philosophy of Mind and Related Matters
Brains

Scientist on the Science of the Self

Brainers may be interested to know about the new blog of Steve Fleming on the science of the self: The Elusive Self 

New Philosophers' Carnival

Here.

Is the mind is a Turing machine? How could we tell?

I have just finished writing a draft of paper on Turing machines being equivalent (or not) to human minds. This is an expanded (but still quite brief in many respects) version of my talk from the last year's Studia Logica conference on Church's Thesis. I defend the mechanist account of implementation of computation, and show that it can be used to make sense of Fodor's 1968 distinction between the weak and strong equivalence of computer simulations to their explanatory targets. I think some of the cross-talk in discussions concerning the multiple realization is due to conflating these two kinds of equivalence.

The paper is available here, and all comments are welcome. It is one of the papers that I started writing when working on my book Explaining the Computational Mind (the draft is available here).

Budapest Semester in Cognitive Science

If you have undergraduate students looking for an interesting study abroad experience that will keep them on track in their philosophy, psychology, computer science, or cognitive science major, please point them towards the Budapest Semester in Cognitive Science (http://www.bscs-us.org/).

It is a really good program, and has had regular participation from scholars doing interesting research in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, such as Colin Allen, John Bickle, Ron Chrisley, Carl Craver, Peter Erdi, and George Kampis.

The official program announcement is below.  If you or your students have any questions about the program, please contact me (tony.chemero@fandm.edu) or the program office at bscs@bscs-us.org.

Cheers,

Tony Chemero

US Director of BSCS

——

The BUDAPEST SEMESTER IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE (BSCS, website: www.bscs-us.org), our Hungarian study abroad program that may be of interest to undergraduate students in Cognitive Science and other disciplines.

BSCS, established in 2003 focuses on cognitive science from an interdisciplinary perspective and offers credit-earning courses in neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, linguistics, biology, and computer science; as well as continuous and optional intensive Hungarian language courses. The program is complemented by an optional independent research module tailored to students' curricula and research interests.

BSCS is hosted by the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at Eotvos Lorand University (ELTE), Hungary's premium science university established in 1635 and serving as a centre of excellence for modern higher education. A world-class new campus has been added to the premises of ELTE, built on the scenic banks of the Danube and hosting the Faculties of Natural and Social Sciences and Informatics, where BSCS courses are held.

Budapest provides an excellent and highly inspiring setting and our vibrant metropolis is a hub of a wide range of interdisciplinary studies and research; boasting a bustling Central European experience with a growing English-speaking academic community. Furthermore, the city serves as a gateway to Vienna, Prague and other major attractions of the region.

The application deadline for the Fall 2012 semester is April 15.

Visit our website for more detailed information (www.bscs-us.org).  Email inquiries to bscs@bscs-us.org, or to Tony Chemero, US Director, tony.chemero@fandm.edu.

successful vs. unsuccessful psychopaths

Bill Hirstein and I have just submitted a paper to the SPP on the criminal culpability of successful vs. unsuccessful psychopaths, and I'm hoping to generate a bit of discussion on the distinction.

Gao and Raine recently published a review of studies distinguishing the two populations within five types of samples: a community recruited sample, individuals from temporary employment agencies, college students, psychopaths employed in business and industry, and psychopathic serial killers (Gao and Raine 2010). Studies suggest that unsuccessful psychopaths have reduced prefrontal and amygdala volumes and hippocampal abnormalities, resulting in reduced executive functioning, including impaired decision-making. Unsuccessful psychopaths also exhibit impaired autonomic/somatic markers and fear-conditioning deficits which contribute to poor and risky decision-making. In contrast, successful psychopaths do not show similar structural and functional impairments of the prefrontal cortex, amygdala and hippocampus. They seem to have intact autonomic function and possibly enhanced executive functioning when compared with normals. Gao and Raine hypothesize that successful psychopaths may have superior cognitive empathy (the ability to understand another’s perspective) without emotional empathy (feeling empathetic emotions).

Our hypothesis is that unsuccessful
psychopaths’ deficiencies in executive processing may be severe enough to constitute evidence of diminished mental capacity. Many successful psychopaths, on the other hand, seem to have a healthy enough executive profile to correct for their lack of emotional empathy. In philosophical terms, they could have done otherwise
. Like a colorblind driver, or a high-functioning autistic person, successful psychopaths would seem to have the ability to take note of their emotional/cognitive lack and make up for it so as to avoid violating the law. If an offender is capable of (knowingly) following a law, she is responsible when she does not.

I'd be happy to hear any comments on this line of thought, and to pass along the whole paper to anyone interested.

Templeton Foundation Open Submission--Starting Soon!

As part of its spring open submission cycle, the John Templeton Foundation welcomes online funding inquiries in the areas of philosophy and theology.  The submission window is February 1 to April 16, 2012.  Proposed philosophical projects need not have religion or theology as a focus.  To submit an online funding inquiry, please visit www.templeton.org/what-we-fund/our-grantmaking-process.  

Please note that the Templeton Foundation does not normally provide dissertation fellowships through this open submission process.  For more information on the kinds of projects that the Foundation can support, visit www.templeton.org/what-we-fund/core-funding-areas/science-and-the-big-questions.

A list of Foundation grants in the areas of philosophy and theology can be found here: http://www.templeton.org/what-we-fund/grant-search/results/taxonomy:5.

CO4 Program

The program for the 4th Online Consciousness Conference is coming together nicely and is nearly finalized. Check it out! The Conference is scheduled for February 17th-March 2nd. Papers will be available online one week before the conference begins. Mark your calendars and spread the word!!

Greetings

Gualtiero kindly gave me an account here, so I am left with the problem of what to post.  A brief introduction.  I have a background in analytic philosophy, first in the philosophy of perception, mostly studying nineteenth century theories of perception and consciousness, and then in philosophy of language, focusing particularly on medieval theories of language, and to some extent medieval theories of intentionality and consciousness.  I recently completed a translation of an early work by Duns Scotus with Jack Zupko of Winnipeg university.

I am not sure what the medieval word for 'consciousness' would be.  They wrote in Latin, and the word 'conscious' derives from the Latin 'conscio', which does mean to be conscious, but in the general sense of joint knowledge, being privy to some fact etc.  It is closely related to 'conscientia', which means something like our word 'conscience'.  Augustine says Nulla enim definitionum illarum timenda est, cum bene sibi conscius est animus, using the word 'conscius', but what he probably means by 'bene sibi conscius est animus' is that the soul (or mind) has a good conscience.  This reminds me of the distinction between 'mind' and 'soul' which the scholastic philosophers were careful to draw, and I wonder if the modern 'consciousness' means something like what they meant by 'soul'.  We tend to avoid 'soul', of course, perhaps because of the religious implications.

The medievals also frequently used the word 'intellectus' which translates loosely as 'understanding', but can also be translated as 'concept' or 'conception'.  

Anyway, enough rambling. To bring me up to date from the medieval period and the early nineteenth century where I got stuck, could the readers of this blog give me a few signposts about some very general questions.  What are the current 'canonical problems' in the philosophy of mind?  Who are the main writers in this area?  Do we distinguish the philosophy of mind from sciences like pychology, psychiatry, neuroscience and so on?

Edward

Philosophers' Carnival

Here.

Women Working in the Philosophy of Mind

Inspired by Trent Dougherty's efforts at Certain Doubts to compile a list of women working in epistemology, Carolyn, Brit, and I have spent some time doing the same for the philosophy of mind. Let me quote Trent's justification for such a project:

I suspect that one of the most common sources of women being under-represented (even at a rate lower than their under-representation in the field) at conferences and in edited volumes (full disclosure: one of my three edited volume projects has no women in it) is the “comes to mind” bias.  One way to counteract this is to “double check.”  But that will not be equally easy for everyone and may have pitfalls of its own.

In light of this, clearly some sort of "master list" can be a very valuable resource. Our initial attempt at making such a list is available at the link below. Please note that this is only a first draft, and we are sure it is error-ridden and has left off far too many people, so please suggest additions and corrections over e-mail or in the comments to this post. I will update the file periodically. Thanks!

Recent Posts

  1. Scientist on the Science of the Self
    Saturday, February 04, 2012
  2. New Philosophers' Carnival
    Monday, January 30, 2012
  3. Is the mind is a Turing machine? How could we tell?
    Saturday, January 28, 2012
  4. Budapest Semester in Cognitive Science
    Thursday, January 26, 2012
  5. successful vs. unsuccessful psychopaths
    Wednesday, January 25, 2012
  6. Templeton Foundation Open Submission--Starting Soon!
    Wednesday, January 25, 2012
  7. CO4 Program
    Tuesday, January 17, 2012
  8. Greetings
    Sunday, January 15, 2012
  9. Philosophers' Carnival
    Monday, January 09, 2012
  10. Women Working in the Philosophy of Mind
    Monday, January 09, 2012

Recent Comments

Calendar

February 2012
SuMoTuWeThFrSa
1234
567891011
12131415161718
19202122232425
26272829

Subscribe


StatCounter

Blog Software