Since the cognitivist revolution around the 1950s, it's become commonplace that cognition involves computation/information processing. The two terms are generally used more or less interchangeably.
But it seems to me that "computation" and "information processing" mean two clearly distinct things. Paradigmatically, computation is the processing of digits according to appropriate rules, whereas information processing is presumably the processing of information, i.e., the processing of signals that carry information about a source, where carrying information means raising the probability that the source is a certain way.
Given the above, computational inputs and outputs may or may not carry information; information processing may or may not be done by means of computing.
Of course, the terms "computation" and "information processing" are used in all kinds of ways, and under some usages, their meanings may well coincide. But in light of the previous comments, it still surprises me that they are used interchangeably so often and seemingly without a second thought. I suspect the reason for this conflation goes back to the cybernetics movement and their effort to blend Shannon's theory of communication (which measured information) and computability theory (as well as control theory). The cybernetic effort was especially influential on psychology and AI, and later on neuroscience. I'm not saying that the cyberneticians conflated computation and information processing. They were clear on the difference between the two. But they established "computation" and "information" as buzzwords that belonged together in a theory of cognition, and after them, many people stopped paying attention to the difference between the two.
Any thoughts on this? Does anyone know of previous discussions of the relationship between computation and information processing? I don't remember ever reading anything explicitly about this. |
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| Posted by gualtiero piccinini at | | | |
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In Perception ...
Processing of the Müller-Lyer illusion by a Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus)
Irene M Pepperberg, Jennifer Vicinay, Patrick Cavanagh Received 28 November 2006, in revised form 31 May 2007; published online 1 May 2008
Abstract. Alex, a Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus)
who identifies the bigger or smaller of two objects by reporting its
color or matter using a vocal English label and who states “none” if
they do not differ in size, was presented with two-dimensional
Müller-Lyer figures (Brentano form) in which the central lines were of
contrasting colors. His responses to “What color bigger/smaller?''
demonstrated that he saw the standard length illusion in the
Müller-Lyer figures in 32 of 50 tests where human observers would also
see the illusion and reported the reverse direction only twice. He did
not report the illusion when (a) arrows on the shafts were
perpendicular to the shafts or closely approached perpendicularity,
(b) shafts were 6 times thicker than the arrows, or (c) after being
tested with multiple exposures—conditions that also lessen or eliminate
the illusion for human observers. These data suggest that parrot and
human visual systems process the Müller-Lyer figure in analogous ways
despite a 175-fold difference in the respective sizes of their brain
volumes. The similarity in results also indicates that parrots with
vocal abilities like Alex’s can be reliably tested on visual illusions
with paradigms similar to those used on human subjects.
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| Posted by kenneth aizawa at | | | |
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| Here. |
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| Posted by gualtiero piccinini at | | | |
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Below is a reference to a recent paper showing specific ways in which (some) data collected using a certain data acquisition system (Plexon) are not trustworthy (from the Journal of Neuroscience Methods). This is significant, as a very large number of labs use Plexon. This could be an interesting case study of the discovery and resolution of problems with measuring devices in neuroscience, a case where if there is a controversial theory based on these data, it could turn out to be the "raw" data that are to blame. This is the kind of thing that can ruin an experimentalist's day! Pubmed link.
The measuring devices in general in neurophysiology are quite delicate and complicated machines, and unlike our advisors, my generation of physiologists can largely get away with having little idea how they work. We buy a patch clamp system from a company, plug it in, and it works. This news about the Plexon system is gonna bite some people in the butt (well, in practice the researchers will just reanalyze their data to see if the results still hold once the problem is corrected for).
Nelson MJ, Pouget P, Nilsen EA, Patten CD, Schall JD. (2008) Review of signal distortion through metal microelectrode recording circuits and filters. J Neurosci Methods. 30;169(1):141-57.
Abstract:
Interest in local field potentials (LFPs) and action potential shape has increased markedly. The present work describes distortions of these signals that occur for two reasons. First, the microelectrode recording circuit operates as a voltage divider producing frequency-dependent attenuation and phase shifts when electrode impedance is not negligible relative to amplifier input impedance. Because of the much higher electrode impedance at low frequencies, this occurred over frequency ranges of LFPs measured by neurophysiologists for one head-stage tested. Second, frequency-dependent phase shifts are induced by subsequent filters. Thus, we report these effects and the resulting amplitude envelope delays and distortion of waveforms recorded through a commercial data acquisition system and a range of tungsten microelectrodes. These distortions can be corrected, but must be accounted for when interpreting field potential and spike shape data.
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| Posted by Eric Thomson at | | | |
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| Here. |
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| Posted by gualtiero piccinini at | | | |
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This has little to do with brains and minds, but I have a student writing a paper on it, and it behooves me to understand what he is talking about.
According to Catholic orthodoxy, God consists of three different Persons: the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. How can that be? Are they the same thing or three different things?
If they are the same thing, then they have the same properties (by the indiscernibility of identicals). But based on what the Bible says, they seem to have different properties. For instance, sometimes the Son speaks to the Father, which suggests that they are doing different things at different times. If they have different properties, then they are different things (by the contrapositive of the indiscernibility of identicals). But this conclusion is polytheistic heresy from a Catholic standpoint.
Is there any other way out of this? Perhaps they partially overlap: they have a common part (a unique divine essence?) but they also have distinct parts (e.g., the Son has his mortal incarnation as a part unique to him). Then we could say that they are "the same God" in the sense of sharing the same divine essence as a common part, but "different Persons" in the sense that they also have their own different parts with different properties. At the moment, this is the only solution that makes sense to me.
Would this solution be remotely acceptable to the Catholic Church? Does anyone know what the Church's official view on this is? What about other Christian denominations? |
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| Posted by gualtiero piccinini at | | | |
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| Here. |
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| Posted by gualtiero piccinini at | | | |
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